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At the start of December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. His pledge was an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

This contrast encapsulates the core tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and ending wars—even as this squares with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson reinforced this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This change is consequential, but observers warn it is premature to judge its results. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Disinterest and Tensions

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Diplomacy and Conditional Action

An analogous standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the harsh rhetoric may have prompted the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Rivals

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.